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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the career 
of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater impacted upon the 
Republican party and the understanding of conservative 
principles. The paper will focus primarily on the years 
spanning Goldwater's presidential campaign in 1964 to the 
Watergate affair in 1974, although some attention will be 
given to the Senator's life and career both prior to, and 
after, these events. Barry Goldwater's relationship with 
other members of the Republican party during this period, 
particularly Richard Nixon, will also be explored.
This paper will show that Barry Goldwater little 
understood the guiding precepts of conservatism as outlined by 
many of his contemporaries. Moreover, his prominent role 
within the Republican party after his 1964 election defeat 
helped bring about the presidency of Richard Nixon. Despite 
obvious philosophical differences between the two men, 
Goldwater supported Nixon through much of the Watergate 
crisis, thus undermining the Republican party. Goldwater's 
reputation as a man who openly criticized Nixon during the 
unraveling of Watergate was not wholly deserved.
MICHAEL JOHN CRAVEN 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
iv
A CONSERVATIVE ENIGMA:
BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1953-1974
INTRODUCTION
Barry Goldwater's run for the presidency in 1964 was a 
significant event in American political history.
No presidential campaign since Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 
contest offered voters a more radical alternative to the 
existing philosophy of government.1 Goldwater, the Republican 
party candidate that year, wanted to redirect the country 
toward a more "conservative" orientation than had been 
practiced in the preceding thirty years. Unlike F.D.R., he 
suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the incumbent, 
President Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, who continued the 
established pattern of government liberalism. Nonetheless, 
Goldwater remained active within the Republican party, and in 
the ten years following his presidential defeat experienced a 
political resurrection in the wake of public reaction to 
Vietnam, the Great Society, and Watergate.
Barry Goldwater often receives credit for injecting 
conservative ideals into the arena of presidential politics 
for the first time. Many would argue, however, that Goldwater 
little understood the guiding precepts of true "conservatism." 
Russell Kirk, a scholar and spokesman for conservative
1 Thoedore H. White, The Making of the President 19 64 (New 
York: Atheneum Publishers, 1965), 295.
2
thinking, defined a conservative as one who protects cherished 
institutions, social and civil order, and individual 
initiative against the trappings of materialism.2 National 
Review contributor Frank S. Meyer said that a conservative 
tries to better the human condition, while resisting the 
notion that man is "perfectible" via government supported 
social engineering. A conservative interprets the
Constitution as it was originally conceived by the Founding 
Fathers. Meyer stressed, however, that such a philosophy 
could never "content itself with appealing to the past. The 
very circumstances that call conscious conservatism into being 
create an irrevocable break with the past."3
Barry Goldwater did not do justice to the concepts that 
embody conservatism. Instead of rallying the American people 
to a viable, relevant alternative to New Deal/Great Society 
liberalism, he allowed the term "conservatism" to stand for, 
in the words of poet-author Peter Viereck, "a facade for 
either plutocratic profiteering or fascist-style thought 
control nationalism."4 That he was considered conservative at 
all, argued historian William O'Neill, "only shows how
2 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Regnery
Books, 1986), iii.
3 William F. Buckley, ed. Did You Ever See a Dream Walking? 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 76, 81-3.
4 Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1949, 1962), 17.
3
4impoverished American conservatism had become."5 This thesis 
will examine the validity of these statements, as well as 
track Barry Goldwater's rise from obscure Senator to 
presidential candidate and Republican party leader.
Chapter one will chronicle Goldwater's early life and 
career, focusing on how factors such as the postwar Republican 
political climate, coupled with the Senator's personal 
attributes, attracted right-wing organizers who launched his 
presidential bid. Chapter two will examine the Goldwater 
presidential campaign, centering on how Goldwater's public 
statements, together with the actions of his followers, 
conflicted with conservative beliefs as outlined by leading 
political intellectuals. This chapter will also explore the 
healing process undertaken by the Republican party following 
Goldwater's defeat and the Senator's role in getting the G.O.P 
to support Richard Nixon in 1968. Chapter three will explain 
Goldwater's role during the Nixon administration up through 
Watergate, when he re-emerged as a party leader and earned a 
reputation— only partially deserved— as the President's chief 
intra-party antagonist.
5 William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart (New York: Times Books,
1971), 108.
CHAPTER I
"I JUST WANTED CONSERVATIVES TO HAVE A VOICE"
That the first presidential nominee clearly identified 
with the Republican party's right-wing hailed from Arizona 
was no accident. The expansion of the Sunbelt after World War 
II made that area a powerful new force in American politics. 
The area's wealth was based on oil, cattle, land development, 
tourism, and defense contracts. It was a region of self-made 
wealth that came about from hard work, as opposed to the 
inherited money so prevalent in the East. With its newly 
realized riches, the Sunbelt demanded its fair share of 
political power. The rugged individualism espoused by the 
Western nouveau-riche was at odds with the sense of noblesse- 
oblige found among the Eastern aristocracy; the former railed 
against the welfare state that had been well entrenched in 
Washington since the days of Franklin Roosevelt. They yearned 
for an alternative that stressed individual initiative instead 
of government largesse.1
Arizona was still a U.S. Territory when Barry Morris 
Goldwater was born on New Year's Day, 1909, the son of a
1 Jonathan Martin Kolkey, The New Right, 1960-1968 With 
Epilogue. 1969-1980 (Washington: University Press of America,
1983), 4.
5
6Jewish retail clothier father and an Episcopalian mother. 
Young Goldwater enjoyed a well-to-do upbringing, having been 
inculcated with his mother's religious beliefs and his 
father's penchant for hard work. Despite the relative wealth 
of his family, Goldwater came to realize that being
"respectable" went beyond having money; it meant showing 
respect toward oneself and others and exercising
responsibility for "paying your way." He was educated at 
Staunton Military Academy in Virginia, then went on to spend
one year at the University of Arizona. His college career was
cut short by his father's sudden death, at which time he went 
to work in the family clothing store. The business went 
through hard times during the Great Depression but managed to 
stay afloat without any layoffs. The experience left a deep 
imprint upon the young businessman's economic philosophy; he 
developed a strong opposition to "governmental borrowing."2
During World War II, Goldwater served as a pilot in the 
Pacific theater. He performed admirably, but came away from 
the ordeal believing that the war could have been avoided if 
the United States had remained militarily strong during the 
interwar years. Upon returning stateside, he helped create an 
Air National Guard unit in Arizona. One of the stipulations 
he insisted upon was that the unit be nonsegregated. He 
continued to serve in the reserves, rising to the rank of 
Major General before retiring in 1967. Throughout his
2 Barry M. Goldwater, With No Apologies (New York: William
Morris, 1979), 22-6.
7political life he was to be a devoted friend of the military, 
advocating a large standing army and ample defense 
expenditures to ensure "victory" in the Cold War.
Goldwater found the staid life of an upscale businessman 
rather bland in comparison to the success he had enjoyed in 
his military endeavors. Since a full-time military career was 
out of the question due to his poor eyesight, he turned his 
attention to an arena that would give him an opportunity to 
express his outspoken views: politics. In 1949 he won
election to the Phoenix City Council in the midst of a reform 
movement to clean up corruption in the city government. The 
next year he helped his friend Howard Pyle win the 
governorship of Arizona. That a Republican like Pyle could 
win in a state with the strong Democratic voting tradition of 
Arizona captured Goldwater's imagination, and in what seemed 
like a risk doomed to failure, he announced his intention to 
run for the United States Senate against incumbent Democratic 
Majority Leader Earnest McFarland.
Goldwater had registered as a Republican as "an act of 
defiance" to the long domination of the Democrats in Arizona 
politics. He was thoroughly disappointed with the policies of 
Franklin Roosevelt, whose New Deal programs never lived up to 
their lofty rhetoric. Goldwater was particularly at odds with
F.D.R.'s National Industrial Recovery Act, which he felt 
allowed too much government interference in private business. 
The Arizonan found the corruption of the Truman administration 
intolerable, and decried the Truman's dismantling of the
8military following World War II. He campaigned for a balanced 
budget, more individual self-reliance, more power to local 
government, a stronger military, and a stronger anti-Communist 
stance in foreign policy.3 Still, he was not nearly so 
militant against the "welfare state" as he would be later in 
his career. In his first campaign speech he said he shared 
voter concern for "retaining the social gains which have been 
made in the past twenty years."4 He came out in favor of 
Social Security, unemployment insurance, and aid to dependent 
children. The only explanation that can be offered to justify 
this seeming contradiction in principles was his determination 
to ride General Dwight Eisenhower's coattails to victory. 
Goldwater defeated McFarland by 7,000 votes.
His campaign platform during this first Senate race 
illustrates a remarkable aspect about Barry Goldwater's 
political philosophy: its almost total fixation upon the
virtues of free-enterprise. Phrases like "welfare state," 
"individual initiative," and "economic freedom" were an 
extensive part of his repertoire. How this correlates with 
the doctrine of conservatism— a philosophy that grew to be 
strongly identified with his name— has been debated by the 
leading intellectuals of that discipline.
Historian Clinton Rossiter, in his book Conservatism in
3 Ibid., 32, 38. Barry M. Goldwater, with Jack Casserly,
Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 63, 96-7.
4 Richard Rovere, The Goldwater Caper (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, and World, 1965), 29.
9America, defined a conservative as one who knows that 
transformations within the government, be they social, 
ideological, or economic, are sometimes necessary for growth 
and progress, but insists that the change be "sure footed and 
respectful of the past." A conservative tends toward 
"stability over change, continuity over experiment, and the 
past over the future." This was opposed to the actions of a 
liberal, whom Rossiter explained would "choose change over 
stability," and "experiment over continuity."5 Conservative 
intellectual scholar George Nash expressed similar views, but 
stressed that conservatives are not "backward-looking." They 
cannot dismiss everything that has come before them. 
Goldwater represented a breed of conservatism that was far to 
the right of such a philosophy. Instead of looking to the 
past to build upon future progress, he retreated into the past 
to find a time when society was presumably better off, and 
sought to reorient the social process back in that direction.6
The new Senator from Arizona did claim to draw 
inspiration from eighteenth-century British politician Edmund 
Burke, whose writings left Goldwater with deep appreciation 
for the relevance of tradition, generational contracts with 
one's forebears, and a distrust of those who seek to better
5 Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America (New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1955), 12.
6 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in 
America Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 191-2.
10
society through government fiat.7 Still, this did little to 
explain his later antipathy for the economic reforms of the 
preceding twenty years which, many would argue, had 
themselves, over time, become institutionalized. Indeed, 
conservative historian Peter Viereck argued that "the real 
American conserver assimilates into conservatism whatever he 
finds lasting and good in liberalism and in the New Deal."8
Although Goldwater rode to victory on the heels of Dwight 
Eisenhower's 1952 presidential triumph, the presidential 
hopeful of most conservatives that year was Senator Robert A. 
Taft. Goldwater supported Ike because he felt the General was 
"a fresh political personality, he could win, and the party 
needed a new beginning."9 The Republicans were back in power, 
both in the White House and in the Senate, but Goldwater's 
affection for Eisenhower would not last.
Goldwater's early Senate career was rather 
undistinguished. As author Jonathan Kolkey put it, his first 
term "featured a dismal attendance record and few legislative 
accomplishments. The gregarious Arizona Solon spent more 
energy hitting the Republican Party banquet circuit."10 With 
the exception of military power, he opposed almost any
7 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 98-9.
8 Viereck, Conservatism. 126.
9 Goldwater, Goldwater. 96.
10 Kolkey, The New Right. 173.
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extension of federal responsibility.11 He was appointed to 
the committees of Banking and Commerce, Public Welfare, and 
Labor. Working in the latter committee, he attacked the 
influence of organized labor in Congress, the political use of 
union slush funds, and forced union membership. He shared the 
Kennedy brothers' contempt for Teamsters President Jimmy 
Hof fa, but when they refused to join him in expressing similar 
views toward United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, 
this convinced Goldwater of the undue financial influence that 
big labor had on the Democratic party. The Arizona Senator's 
outspokenness garnered him the label "number one enemy" of 
labor, and union bosses poured an enormous amount of money 
into ensuring Goldwater's defeat for re-election in 1958. 
That they were unsuccessful attests to the relative lack of 
sympathy for big labor in Arizona, and the West, at that 
time.12
While Goldwater's tangle with organized labor may have 
stood him in good stead with his constituents, Peter Viereck 
argued that the Senator had perhaps gone too far in his 
attacks on labor as a whole. American conservatives, he 
suggested, needed to stop looking at labor as the enemy. 
Indeed, trade unions were unwittingly the agents of promoting 
conservatism through their empowerment of the working class, 
providing what British poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor
11 Rovere, Goldwater Caper. 35-6.
12 Goldwater, Goldwater. 100-1.
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Coleridge described as the "intermediate between both 
doctrinaire capitalism and socialism.1,13
One experience in the Senator's early career that was 
especially significant was his appointment as head of the 
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee in 1955. This post 
allowed him to travel extensively, with the dual effect of 
gaining even more national exposure and the chance to meet 
influential G.O.P. leaders across the nation who would help 
him in his future presidential race. During Goldwater's 
frequent absences from the Senate chamber, he could be found 
crisscrossing the nation stumping for the party.
The Eisenhower years were ones of frustration for the 
young Senator. Ike's administration was seen by many on the
G. 0. P. right as a preservation of the New Deal, with its 
failure to "roll back" both the New/Fair Deal programs at home 
and Communism abroad.14 Eisenhower was re-elected in 1956, 
but while the nation still liked Ike, many Republicans went 
down to defeat.
Goldwater broke with Eisenhower in April 1957 over the 
President's budget proposal for that year. One of the 
conditions that had made Ike acceptable to party conservatives 
in his 1952 campaign was his promise to reduce the size of the 
federal budget. The 1957 proposal of 71.8 billion dollars, on 
the contrary, was the largest peacetime budget proposal in
13 Viereck, Conservatism. 40, 135.
14 David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 
(Lexington, KY: University of KY Press, 1983), 107.
13
history. On the Senate floor, Goldwater assailed the 
President for failing to live up to his campaign promise and 
for putting forth proposals that, far from offering 
alternatives to the "socialistic" welfare programs of the last 
two decades, instead "aped New Deal antics."15 Author David 
Reinhard views this "Battle of the Budget" as the opening 
skirmish in the war for control of the G. 0. P. between the 
various party factions. The budget issue, while an effective 
target in its own right, was used by the right-wing as a 
vehicle with which to attack Eisenhower's "Modern 
Republicanism" which noted conservative commentator William 
Buckley faulted for trying to please everybody while being 
devoid of objective. Goldwater voted in support of only 52 
percent of administration proposals after the budget crisis.16
The right-wing Republican break with Eisenhower served as 
evidence, according to George Nash, of conservatism's "growing 
isolation from American politics." Dogmatic arguments 
extolling the virtues of states' rights, individual freedom 
and unrestrained free-market capitalism were not appealing to 
the average American, who more than likely benefitted from the 
federal largesse of the last twenty years. It was no longer 
relevant to warn people about the ill effects of the welfare 
state, because much of it had become rooted into the federal 
system. Conservatives had to show examples of liberal failure
15 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 64.
16 Reinhard, Republican Right. 140-1; William F. Buckley, Up 
From Liberalism (New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 1959), 95, 97.
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in areas like urban renewal, minimum wage, taxes, forced 
desegregation, and Social Security.17 Clinton Rossiter 
observed that if conservatism was to have a future it must 
"practice a conservatism that is mature, constructive, and 
responsible." In order to do this the various party factions 
had to find common ground and press for change not for its own 
sake, but because it is needed, limited in scope, and respects 
the laws and traditions of society.18
With his re-election in 1958, Senator Barry Goldwater 
emerged as the preeminent national figure of the Republican 
right. In the previous decade a number of conservative 
luminaries, both famous and infamous, had passed from the 
scene. Robert Taft and Joseph McCarthy were dead, and Senate 
Majority Leader William Knowland had run an unsuccessful 
campaign for the governorship of California. What Goldwater 
lacked in major legislative accomplishments he made up for 
with a vigorous speaking schedule. His tenure as Republican 
Campaign Chairman allowed him to stump tirelessly for G.O.P. 
candidates and to meet various local party bosses, which 
boosted his recognition among the Republican rank-and-file. 
All of these phenomena combined to make the once obscure 
Arizona Senator a major player in Republican party politics.19
17 George H. Nash, Conservative Intellectual. 2 55, 27 3-4.
18 Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America. 3, 29.
19 M. Stanton Evans, The Future of Conservatism (Garden City, 
New York: Anchor Books, 1969), 231; Michael Miles, The
Odvssev of the American Right (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 286-7.
15
Barry Goldwater was different from the above-named 
predecessors, most notably Ohio Senator Robert Taft, in a 
number of ways. The latter was a master of procedure in the 
Senate, and a number of major legislative proposals bore his 
name. He had been a candidate for his party's presidential 
nomination in 1948 and 1952, both times losing to Republican 
contenders considerably to the left of himself. While 
essentially a foe of what historian Alonzo Hamby called 
"Rooseveltian liberalism,1 Taft could be surprisingly moderate 
on specific issues, such as federal housing and aid for 
education.20 He championed the free-market economy as the key 
to economic prosperity, but his approach to economic problems 
was pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. He once said that the 
free-enterprise system "has certain faults" and warned that if 
such a system did not try to eliminate poverty it would be 
replaced "by a less progressive system which does."21
Taft fought each New Deal proposal tenaciously, but once 
it was enacted he moved on to another battle.22 Clinton 
Rossiter would have approved of the way Taft justified his 
support of some government activities by "fitting them into
20 Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: F.D.R.
to Bush (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 104-5.
21 James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin, 1972), 318-9.
22 A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change. The 
Nixon and Ford Administrations (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1981), 22-6.
16
his magic formula of equality of opportunity."23 Indeed, 
Robert A. Taft was a complex, practical politician more than 
he was an adherent to any party doctrine. To him, 
conservatism did not mean "constant opposition to change or a 
failure to respond to problems that people were asking the 
federal government to address."24 He saw the utility of a 
number of liberal programs, and saw the need for the federal 
government to provide at least a bare-minimum of protection to 
its citizens. The Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill provided for low 
income housing, slum clearance, and urban renewal, and serves 
as an example of how the Ohio Senator sought a broader 
perspective for conservatism than market economics.25
Taft's biographer James Patterson pointed out that the 
Ohio Senator's social-welfare convictions were not born of 
altruism. Rather, they were formulated through disinterested 
intellectual analysis. As a result, Taft usually appeared 
passionless when addressing fundamental problems of human 
suffering, and failed to capitalize politically on a subject 
"that deeply moved socially conscious Americans."26
Unlike the relatively pragmatic Taft, Goldwater appeared 
to be motivated by more rigid ideological considerations. 
This political philosophy was best illustrated by a book
23 Rossiter, Conservatism in America. 196.
24 Reinhard, Republican Right. 110.
25 Reichley, Ace of Change. 50.
26 Patterson, Mr. Republican. 325.
17
released in 1960 entitled The Conscience of a Conservative.
Although short in length, the book caused a huge sensation in 
Republican party circles and further propelled the Arizona 
Senator into the national limelight. In it Goldwater argued 
that a conservative views politics as "the art of achieving 
the maximum amount of freedom for individuals that is 
consistent with the maintenance of social order."27 In 
support of this philosophy, he put forth arguments that 
maintained a constitutionally rigid approach regarding 
education, labor, states rights, and civil rights. Goldwater 
maintained that while it may be good in principle to allow 
black children access to traditionally white schools, they "do 
not have a civil right to do so which is protected by the 
federal constitution, or which is enforceable by the federal 
government."28 The tenth amendment reserved such matters to 
the jurisdiction of state governments. Goldwater also railed 
against agricultural price supports and the overreaching power 
of labor unions. Regarding the latter, the Senator asserted 
that their only legitimate function was collective bargaining; 
they crossed the line when they engaged in activities that had 
nothing to do with employment. In sum, the federal government
27 Barry M. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative 
(Shepherdsville, KY: Victor Publishing Co., 1960), 70. It
has been widely speculated (and often accepted) that Goldwater 
did not write this book himself; prominent right-wing 
intellectual L. Brent Bozell ghostwrote it using a compilation 
of Goldwater speeches as a guide. Goldwater's name, however, 
appears on the cover, and he has always assumed responsibility 
for the book's contents.
28 Ibid., 28.
18
must scale back from those programs that it had no 
constitutional authority to direct: welfare, federal housing,
agriculture, and urban renewal. Control of these programs lay 
with state and local governments. Pat Buchanan perhaps put it 
best when he asserted that "Goldwater argued that faithfulness 
to the Constitution was more important than even the most 
salutary reform that might come of restricting the freedoms 
the Constitution guaranteed.1,29
Goldwater took exception to the liberal record in foreign 
policy as well. His most forceful argument was that our 
leaders had not made "victory" in the Cold War the highest 
priority. He advocated withdrawing recognition to Communist 
regimes and withholding foreign aid to all nations except 
those committed to the anti-Communist struggle. Most of all, 
in order to win the Cold War, the United States must not be 
afraid to wage it. Our nuclear arsenal meant nothing if our 
leaders were clearly afraid to use it. He urged America to 
forsake the United Nations in the fight against Communism, 
calling it an unconstitutional encroachment on United States 
sovereignty.30
The success of Conscience of a Conservative no doubt did 
the most to put Barry Goldwater's name on the national 
political map. Whereas Robert Taft had been an effective 
legislator, Goldwater had been an effective salesman. His
29 Ibid., xii, 43, 60.
30 Ibid., 91, 94, 108.
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"pure and simple message," wrote author David Reinhard, "made 
him the Right-Wing Republican best suited to the realities of 
presidential politics in postwar America."31 Political 
historian Theodore White disagreed, charging that Goldwater 
aroused, rather than harnessed, emotions. He was a moralizer, 
not an organizer. People who felt the emotional impact of his 
words were appalled by things like "Communism, waste, 
weakness, government bureaucracy and anarchy." At the fringes 
were "madmen and psychopaths disturbed by conspiracy, Negroes, 
Jews, Catholics, and beardies." This was radically different 
from Taft followers of the past who sometimes seemed only to 
want to "hold the country still." Goldwater represented a new 
breed of conservative from the G.O.P. right-wing which 
"insisted that the course of affairs be reversed."32
On the lighter side of political climbing, Barry 
Goldwater became the first member of the Republican right to 
attract national appeal because he possessed qualities that 
were at a premium in the early stages of television media 
coverage. He was ruggedly handsome and, despite the sharpness 
of his political theses, possessed a very charming, albeit 
disarming, candor. In public appearances he had a knack for 
speaking in a way that the lay person could understand.33 
This was in marked contrast with Robert Taft. The Ohio
31 Reinhard, Republican Right. 160-1.
32 White, Making of the President. 89-90.
33 Evans, Future. 231.
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Senator was an unparalleled legislator and sported impressive 
conservative credentials, but his monotonous public speaking 
and unattractive physique failed to electrify an increasingly 
image conscious electorate. William Knowland was similarly 
handicapped. That the Republican party— most notably the 
right-wing— had a star in the making was becoming apparent.34 
I960, however, was too soon to push for party control. Vice- 
President Richard Nixon, a man who possessed a far different 
personal and political demeanor than Barry Goldwater, had the 
backing of G.O.P. delegates, as well as the party service 
credentials, to assure a formidable run for the White House 
that year.
In nineteen-sixty the race for the Republican nomination 
was between Vice-President Richard Nixon and New York Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller. The former supported government action in 
domestic affairs, was a notorious hard-liner on Communism, and 
was a loyal supporter of Eisenhower.35 Rockefeller, whom 
author James Reichley categorized as a "Progressive" 
Republican, advocated government action to meet public needs, 
but still placed great stock in private and state initiative. 
He was for a balanced budget but also for federal health 
insurance and aid to education. Given these positions some, 
including Goldwater, wondered why Rockefeller was even a 
Republican at all. Indeed, had he been a Democrat, Reichley
34 Reinhard, Republican Right. 159-61; Evans, Future, 233.
35 Reichley, Age of Change. 50.
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suggested that the New York Governor might well have won the 
presidency at some point, but he possessed a commitment to 
"social continuity that prevented him from becoming a true 
liberal." He viewed reform as a way to preserve the 
traditional system.36
Actually, it was not much of a contest. Nixon, as the 
incumbent Vice-President, was nearly automatic for the party 
nod. He infuriated Goldwater, however, by agreeing to meet 
with Rockefeller in New York City and allowing for the 
inclusion of a number of left-leaning programs into the party 
platform: support for Negro sit-ins in the South, government
efforts to stimulate the economy, and a federal medical 
program for the elderly. Goldwater called it "an American 
Munich"; it was a sellout of conservative ideals to appease 
the party establishment yet again. Despite a groundswell of 
support for the Arizona Senator himself, Goldwater had planned 
to attend the Republican convention in New York ready to back 
Nixon. Now he had second thoughts. When the South Carolina 
delegation put Goldwater's name in nomination, he initially 
decided to let it stand, hoping the move would dissuade Nixon 
from taking the nomination for granted. Goldwater had no 
illusions about preventing Nixon's nomination, however, and in 
the end withdrew his own name and called for party unity.37
There was support for Goldwater for the Vice-Presidential
36 Ibid., 32-3, 298.
37 Reinhard, Republican Right. 102, 153.
22
spot on the ticket. National Review columnist L. Brent Bozell 
suggested that it would have been unwise for the Senator to 
accept the post because he would have lost a great deal of the 
independence he enjoyed as a spokesman for the Republican 
right. He would have had to stump for Nixon, which meant 
having to defend the distinctly "anti-conservative" record of 
the Eisenhower administration.38 As it turned out, Goldwater 
campaigned for Nixon not out of any ideological fervor for the 
Republican candidate, but out of fear of the Democratic 
alternative, Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts.39
Kennedy's defeat of Nixon was the final straw for the 
Republican right. The Vice-President had tried to appease all 
wings of the party and satisfied none, resulting in yet 
another liberal "me-too" Republican loss at the polls. In the 
wake of the 1960 defeat the Republican right-wing was 
determined to take over the party apparatus and re-make the 
G.O.P. into what it was truly meant to be: a conservative
alternative to New Deal liberalism.40 Foreign policy events 
surrounding the 1960 election only served to enhance the 
political climate in favor of the G.O.P right. The "loss" of 
Cuba to Fidel Castro highlighted liberal failure in containing 
Communism, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 19 61 only
38 Kolkey, New Right. 176.
39 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 102.
40 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., The History of American 
Presidential Elections (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), vol.
IV, 1940-1968. 3566.
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heightened this awareness.41 Goldwater himself stated, "call 
me a hawk if you like . . .  in our angry, aggressive world, 
peace can be preserved only by military power, supported by a 
people prepared to sacrifice to protect their freedom."42
Reaction to Nixon's loss coupled with foreign and 
domestic crises during the Kennedy administration— Cuba, 
rising involvement in Vietnam, civil rights disturbances, and 
a pending civil rights bill— led a Republican political 
consultant named F. Clifton White to begin planning a strategy 
for taking control of the G.O.P. and handing it to the right- 
wing, the section of the Republican party that White felt best 
represented conservative beliefs. White was a former head of 
the Young Republicans and a Nixon supporter in 1960 who had 
since become a "dedicated conservative." In late summer 1961 
White gathered several influential friends in Chicago and 
talked of seizing the G.O.P. Goldwater was contacted, and 
while he refused to lend his name to the organization, he also 
refused to repudiate it. White went ahead with his plan to 
mobilize conservatives and organize volunteers to gather 
Goldwater delegates for 1964. Early in 1963 the Arizona 
Senator was again contacted by White, who had considerable 
success in mobilizing grass-roots support for him. Goldwater 
seemed annoyed at the publicity but still did not repudiate 
White's efforts. The National Draft Goldwater Committee was
41 Kolkey, New Right. 32.
42 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 132.
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announced in February 1963, with White as national director. 
When 7,000 people showed up at a Draft Goldwater rally in 
Washington, D.C., it was clear that Goldwater could no longer 
ignore the movement.43
The chain of events just described make it clear that 
Goldwater and the so-called "movement" so strongly identified 
with his name were, in fact, two separate entities. Goldwater 
did not initiate the series of events that led to his 
presidential candidacy. Indeed, he had no desire to be 
President. At the height of the Draft Goldwater campaign in 
1963 he was "still wishing something would happen to get me 
out of all this. It's all a little frightening.1144 More to 
the point, Goldwater's own political convictions— as opposed 
to those such as Brent Bozell who wrote political pieces for 
him— were hard to ascertain. The written tracts had a 
"doctrinaire shrillness" not present in his informal dialogue. 
Liberal political columnist Richard Rovere, in his book The 
Goldwater Caper, speculated that Goldwater's conservatism was 
not a pose, but his association with conservative 
intellectuals like Bozell, William F. Buckley, and Russell 
Kirk was odd. After all, Goldwater's conversion to the far 
right-wing was either very recent or his early Senate campaign 
had been run on false pretenses; he had won election as an 
Eisenhower Republican. Rovere's explanation for Goldwater's
43 White, Making of the President. 93.
44 Rovere, Goldwater Caper. 12.
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drift toward the Republican right lay in the fact that the 
Senator was "a restless politician without any ideas distinct 
enough to give him an identity; the National Review crowd had 
plenty of political ideas but no politicians to give them 
currency."45 Thus Goldwater's appeal to men like Clifton 
White, who would mold the Senator's considerable popular 
appeal into his plans for taking over the Republican party.
By 1963 many political observers conceded that President 
Kennedy could face trouble in the next election. A Time 
magazine poll found that while the President still had a 
commanding lead, "Barry Goldwater could give Kennedy a 
breathlessly close contest."46 A Gallup poll taken in August 
1963 showed Goldwater leading Kennedy in the South by a margin 
of 54 to 38 percent, although the President still led 
nationally. The West could also be trouble for Kennedy, who 
had carried only three sparsely populated states in that 
region in 1960. Goldwater, an Arizonan, was sure to have 
solid support there.47
In the political climate of the country, a growing 
discontent could be felt. Supreme Court decisions authorizing 
desegregation led to "white backlash" in the nation's cities, 
fueled by whites who were fed up with increasing black 
militancy. The Communist issue in Cuba helped spawn anti-
45 Ibid., 43, 118.
46 Evans, Future. 106.
47 Miles, Odvssev. 292.
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Communist groups like the John Birch Society. This 
organization and others like it would find a Goldwater 
candidacy very appealing.48
The assassination of President Kennedy effectively 
destroyed any chance, however remote, of a successful 
Goldwater presidential campaign. The two men had disagreed on 
virtually every political position, yet they remained 
personally cordial. Goldwater had looked forward to 
campaigning against Kennedy, and the two had even informally 
agreed to travel the country in the same train and debate the 
issues face to face. The Senator was convinced that Kennedy 
would have run a clean campaign, and that the contest would 
have exposed the true philosophical differences between the 
two political parties.49
The elevation of Lyndon Baines Johnson to the presidency 
took away key factors that would have made for a compelling 
presidential race. The campaign was no longer an East- 
West/conservative-liberal battle. Johnson was a Westerner (as 
well as a Southerner) who at the time had no recognizable 
ideology. Equally important was the fact that the American 
people had rallied behind L.B.J. and would be in no mood to 
suffer three presidents in little over one year.50
Goldwater was clearly in a quandary. He certainly did
48 Schlesinger, Elections, 3567.
49 Goldwater, Goldwater. 138-9.
50 Evans, Future. 108.
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not relish the possibility of running against Johnson; he 
understood that public support for the new President, coupled 
with L.B.J.'s own history of political chicanery, would 
prevent a campaign based on issues. Regardless, the grass­
roots campaign that had been at work the last two years trying 
to capture a Goldwater nomination had progressed too far to be 
abandoned. After much soul-searching, Goldwater was persuaded 
by his advisors to go through with the contest, if not for his 
own sake, then for the sake of his, and their, "message.1 On 
January 3, 1964, Goldwater reluctantly announced his
candidacy. The man who described himself as the most 
unwilling presidential aspirant of the twentieth century, 
reflecting years later upon his ill-starred campaign, stated, 
"In my gut, there was never a burning desire to be President. 
I just wanted the conservatives to have a real voice in the 
country.1,51
The Goldwater campaign started off rather inauspiciously, 
the candidate having finished a disappointing third in New 
Hampshire, site of the first primary. Although Clifton 
White's three-year crusade to win over G.O.P delegates had all 
but assured the Arizona Senator the party nomination well in 
advance of the convention, Goldwater had to win at least one 
important primary in order to prove himself a credible vote- 
getter. That victory came in California, where, in the wake 
of a massive public relations blitz throughout the state,
51 Goldwater, Goldwater. 154.
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Goldwater won a razor-thin victory over his closest rival, 
Nelson Rockefeller.
The Arizona Senator's quest for the nomination was 
hampered by his own controversial public statements. He 
criticized Social Security and the United Nations in front of 
a crowd of predominately elderly people in New Hampshire, 
advocated selling the T.V.A. to a gathering in Knoxville, 
Tennessee, and on national television suggested using nuclear 
weapons to defoliate Vietcong supply routes. Not only did 
these statements confirm the Senator's acute lack of timing, 
they were picked up by both the national media and his 
intraparty opponents, thus beginning the trend of Goldwater 
having to repeatedly clarify or defend his remarks. This 
constant attention to political damage control by the 
candidate and his handlers would undermine the Goldwater 
campaign to its inglorious conclusion.52
Goldwater survived the slings and arrows of his 
detractors during the primary campaign and arrived at the Cow 
Palace in San Francisco, site of the G.O.P. convention, ready 
to receive the party blessing as its standard-bearer. He got 
the nomination, but political infighting between the various 
G.O.P. factions shattered Goldwater's credibility as the 
leader of a unified party. When Nelson Rockefeller took the 
stage to condemn the takeover of the G.O.P. by right-wing 
extremist groups that did not represent the true philosophy of
52 Miles, Odvssev. 296; White, Making of the President. 3 03; 
Reinhard, Republican Right. 184.
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the party, he was all but drowned-out by disapproving shouts 
emanating from Goldwater supporters seated in the upper decks 
of the hall. Goldwater proclaimed in his acceptance speech 
that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no 
vice. . . . Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no
virtue." This statement alarmed many of his G.O.P. 
colleagues, including former President Eisenhower, who thought 
Goldwater was saying that the ends justified the means. A 
meeting was scheduled with the former President to clarify the 
statement to Ike's satisfaction. Eisenhower, for his part, 
remained a reluctant supporter of Goldwater, seeing the 
candidate's "extremism" as a repudiation of his own policies 
as President. He found Goldwater's backhanded courting of 
anti-civil rights voters distateful, and was skeptical of the 
Senator's competence in foreign policy. Yet with Nixon out of 
the contest, Ike viewed Goldwater as a better alternative than 
Rockefeller for the nomination.53
During the convention a letter attributed to Pennsylvania 
Governor William Scranton was delivered to Goldwater, which 
read in part, "You have too often allowed the radical 
extremists to use you. . . .You have too often stood for
irresponsibility in the serious question of racial 
holocaust."54 Years later, Goldwater claimed that prior to
53 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984), vol. 2, The President. 652-3.
54 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 185. Scranton disavowed 
authorship of the letter, claiming that a member(s) of his staff 
drafted it without his knowledge or approval.
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the revelation of the Scranton letter, the Pennsylvania 
Governor was his first choice for a running mate. Instead 
Goldwater turned to an obscure New York Congressman named 
William Miller, a Northern Catholic and a man with a 
reputation for being a ruthless partisan debater. Goldwater 
thought Miller could put Lyndon Johnson on the defensive 
during the campaign. As it turned out he never got the 
chance.55
The so-called "extremist groups" to which Rockefeller and 
Scranton referred included the John Birch Society, which 
endorsed Goldwater's tough talk on Communism, and the Ku Klux 
Klan, which cheered the Senator's refusal to vote in favor of 
the 19 64 Civil Rights bill, a move that also made him dear to 
the heart of unreconstructed Southern Rednecks.
Barry Goldwater was not personally racist. He had hired 
minorities at his department store, had contributed 
financially to the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League, and had 
voted in favor of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. His 
refusal to endorse the 1964 Civil Rights bill rested on his 
commitment to states' rights. But Richard Rovere pointed out 
that his strength was with people who ignored his personal 
views and cheered his political record.56 Therein was the 
difference between the candidate and the "movement" for whom 
he had become a symbol. Goldwater later claimed that his
55 White, Making of the President. 214-5.
56 Rovere, Goldwater Caper, 86.
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failure to condemn these groups would have done more harm to 
his campaign than good: "The last thing conservatives needed
was to begin a factional war by reading small minorities or 
individuals out of our ranks. We were struggling to 
strengthen ourselves, if not merely to survive."57
Despite the wounding Goldwater received at the convention 
by his fellow party members, he easily secured the G.O.P. 
nomination. And despite the unlikeliness of a successful run 
at the presidency, Goldwater could not be completely dismissed 
at that particular time. He had arrived, in 1964, at a 
fortuitous moment in history, for it seemed that the liberal 
orthodoxy of the last 32 years had lost its vigor. The sense 
of malaise following the Eisenhower years, followed by the 
mounting political trouble of the Kennedy administration, 
allowed for the potential of widespread support for a 
conservative candidate. Moreover, labor unions, the backbone 
of Democratic party support, were looked upon by many as 
ineffective bureaucracies, and many of the Depression-spawned 
federal programs had lost their usefulness.58
Goldwater tried to answer to charges that he was trapped 
in the past: "We conservatives are always blamed for wanting
to go backwards. That is not true. . . .everything that this 
administration is trying today has been tried not just in our 
own government, but in other governments. . . and they have
57 Goldwater, Goldwater, 127.
58 White, Making of the President. 213.
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never succeeded."59 He could not, however, swing such 
sentiment into his favor. The fact was that most Americans, 
despite their complaints, were satisfied with the current 
system, and Goldwater's doctrinaire ruminations about 
disbanding existing programs and privatizing Social Security 
were seen by many as a frightening alternative. William 
O'Neill observed that Goldwater, as a man of inherited wealth, 
little understood the complexities of the economic issues he 
confronted. "The average businessman felt more comfortable 
with Lyndon Johnson, a self-made millionaire who knew how the 
money was really made."60
The contrast between Goldwater and Johnson was striking. 
The latter, despite outward behavior that would suggest a 
certain lack of refinement, was in fact a very complex 
individual. Remarking on their differing approaches, Johnson 
stated that "our separate experiences had shaped political 
philosophies in substantial opposition to each other."61 
While Barry Goldwater had been a product of the Sunbelt 
Nouveau-riche, L.B.J. had been reared in privation as the son 
of a dirt farmer in the Texas hill country. He knew from 
personal experience the hardship and suffering caused by 
poverty. He had won elective office as a faithful supporter 
of F.D.R. and the New Deal, and spent the bulk of his
59 Ibid., 337.
60 O'Neill, Coming Apart. 114.
61 Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 102.
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political career— as a Congressman, Senator, and President—  
trying to get the federal government to acknowledge a greater 
share of social and economic responsibility toward individual 
people.
Even those who disagreed with Johnson's convictions 
admitted that he was exceedingly shrewd in the arena of 
politics. Whereas Barry Goldwater espoused old-fashioned 
virtues that categorized issues and people as strictly "good" 
or "evil", L.B.J. understood that everyone carried shadings of 
both. He saw no "all good" or "all bad" in anyone, and this 
allowed him more political range. He surrounded himself with 
people ranging from respected Democratic Senator Hubert 
Humphrey to dubious Texas crony Bobby Baker and used them to 
his advantage.62 Reflecting back on the campaign, Johnson 
said that he captured the political center because Goldwater 
was too far right and made no attempt to appeal to other 
political factions. As a consequence, L.B.J. saw an 
opportunity to seek a mandate for his social programs. He 
sought to give the voters a "choice not between conservatism 
and 'stand-patism' but between programs of social retreat and 
programs of social progress."63
On November 3, 1964, voters overwhelmingly elected Lyndon 
Johnson to continue as President of the United States by a 
margin of forty-three million votes to Barry Goldwater's
62 White, Making of the President. 211.
63 Johnson, Vantage Point. 103.
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twenty-seven million. Johnson's showing in the electoral 
college was even more convincing: 486 to 52. Five of the six
states that went for Goldwater (Arizona was the exception) 
were located in the Deep South, where the Republican party 
profited due to white backlash over the civil rights 
revolution. Election day had also proven costly for 
Republicans in Congress. The G.O.P. lost thirty-eight seats 
in the House of Representatives and two in the Senate. At the 
time, it appeared that Barry Goldwater's call for extremism in 
the defense of liberty had proven to be a very disastrous vice 
for the Republican party.
CHAPTER II
"I AM NOT A SOMETIME REPUBLICAN"
Following Barry Goldwater's massive electoral defeat, 
political commentators— including many conservative 
intellectual pundits— were quick to analyze the reasons behind 
the failure. Much of the blame was levelled at the 
candidate's own incompetence. Some, like Russell Kirk and 
conservative political scientist Willmoore Kendall, had long 
deplored Goldwater's singular obsession with economics, 
individual initiative, and strict interpretation of the 
Constitution.1 Even William F. Buckley acknowledged that 
while a conservative tried to block most new expansions of 
"State" authority, he stopped short of a "doctrinaire 
application of the capitalist paradigm to every sphere."2 
Critics also stressed that his political record on civil 
rights hurt him tremendously. Had he voted in favor of the 
1964 Civil Rights bill, he could have discussed the issue 
without coming off as a racist. In a similar vein Theodore 
White argued that had Goldwater forthrightly addressed the
1 Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Mind (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Co., 1963), xi; Russell Kirk, A Program for 
Conservatives (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), 6.
2 Nash, Conservative Intellectual. 323.
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misunderstandings over issues like nuclear energy and social 
security when they first surfaced, he could have avoided much 
of the media assault he endured throughout the campaign.3 
Richard Rovere observed that Goldwater's political philosophy 
contradicted his campaign rhetoric. The most glaring example 
was the candidate's proposal to use the federal government to 
ensure "law and order." He would have had difficulty 
reconciling this approach with his states' rights principles. 
As a result a Goldwater government might well have been 
paralyzed by one constitutional crisis after another.4
All of the preceding arguments highlighted the fact that 
Barry Goldwater, appeared to be not a candidate with credible 
alternatives to the current system, but a cantankerous 
reactionary who could not make his agenda relevant to the 
lives of everyday people. Chief among the Goldwater critics 
in this respect was Clinton Rossiter, who held the candidate's 
conservative credentials suspect from the outset. People like 
Goldwater, who "favor disbanding current programs and . . .
radical means to alter the philosophical bent of government" 
were what Rossiter termed "pseudo-conservatives."5 Rossiter, 
like White, believed that a conservative must adapt his agenda 
to the realities of twentieth-century life rather than "roll 
back the social process to the time at which his countrymen
3 White, Making of the President. 344-5.
4 Rovere, Goldwater Caper, 136-7.
5 Rossiter, Conservatism in America. 185.
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first went foolishly astray.1'6 This was a notion any Burkean 
conservative held dear. Moreover, Rossiter argued that 
political authority was too important in the postwar world to 
cling to the naive assumption that "the best government is the 
least and the least government the best."7
Goldwater's grass-roots strength remained strong in spite 
of his defeat, as evidenced by the enormous amount of mail he 
continued to receive. While it is not unusual for national 
political candidates to get a lot of mail, the tone of much of 
Goldwater's correspondence reveals quite a bit about the type 
of support that he generated. Shortly after the election, a 
retired Air Force major general had written stating that "We
lost the battle but we must win the war! But it is imperative
that we have your leadership. There just isn't anyone else 
who can do it. I am convinced that you can lead us to
victory."8 Another person wrote to warn that those who
supported the Goldwater crusade "cannot camp with the enemy 
and be comfortable. . . .We cannot bargain with the enemy and 
hope to survive."9 This person's "enemies" list included 
Republicans Rockefeller and Scranton, New York Senator Jacob 
Javits, and Michigan Governor George Romney, all of whom were,
6 Ibid., 14.
7 Ibid., 35.
8 Major General Frederic E. Glantzberg, U.S.A.F. (retired) to 
Goldwater, November 16, 1964, Barry Goldwater Papers. (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University, 1964-5), Microfilm.
9 A.G. Blackmon to Goldwater, December 19, 1964, Goldwater 
Papers.
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in varying degress, more liberal than Goldwater. These were
exactly the kinds of statements that made prominent
Republicans and conservative intellectuals apprehensive about 
supporting Goldwater. He appealed to people who were not 
content to reform the existing state of affairs. Such people 
saw the campaign as a war, with Goldwater's victory presaging 
a revolution in the philosophy of government and a retooling 
of the social and economic order of the nation. Their 
allegiance was to the candidate, not the party.10
If Goldwater was not quite so personally militant as his 
followers, he did nothing to alleviate the shrillness of their 
crusade. Years before Goldwater became a household name, 
Russell Kirk warned of such a phenomenon, stating that
"Conservatism is not an ideology. . . .It does not breed
fanatics. It does not try to excite the enthusiasm of a 
secular religion." Rather, conservatives "seek, reasonably 
and prudently, to reconcile the best in the wisdom of our 
ancestors with the change which is essential to a vigorous 
social existence."11
Despite his overwhelming defeat, Goldwater did manage to 
gather a considerable number of votes. Two questions need to 
be addressed, however. First, how many of those votes were 
directly for Goldwater? Second, would a different candidate 
have fared any better? Look magazine writers Lewis Bean and
10 Viereck, Conservatism. 146; White, Making of the President. 
90; Schlesinger, Elections. 3 885.
11 Kirk, Program. 6.
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Roscoe Drummond surmised that all but about two or three 
million were votes not for Goldwater, but for the Republican 
party. Goldwater's vote tally in the South, despite an active 
campaign strategy aimed at that region, was actually worse 
than the combined votes of Thomas Dewey and Strom Thurmond in 
1948. Bean and Drummond suspected that had a more 
"traditional" candidate been nominated, he would have gotten 
more votes (possibly up to 32-33 million) and hypothesized 
that the party could rebuild if it did not "further alienate 
its large body of unwavering supporters by chasing after the 
fractionable rainbow of the extreme right." They agreed with 
Arthur Schlesinger that the country had no particular 
affection for Lyndon Johnson, and that Goldwater's support was 
"deep but narrow," while Johnson's had been "broad but quite 
shallow.1112
In spite of his defeat, Goldwater's strength at local and 
state levels remained strong. More importantly, he had forced 
the Republican party to examine its own philosophical 
principles. Between 1940 and 1960 the party's presidential 
nominees, Wendell Willkie, Thomas Dewey, and Dwight
12 Louis Bean and Roscoe Drummond, "How Many Votes Does 
Goldwater Own?" Look 29 (March 3, 1965): 75-6. The way the
authors determined this is rather complex. Of seventy million 
voters in 19 64, 51 percent were Democrats, 29 percent were
Republicans, and 2 0 percent were Independents. That left the 
G.O.P. with twenty million of the seventy million active 
voters. Fifteen percent of these named Goldwater as their 
first choice; the other 85 percent were split among Nixon, 
Romney, Lodge,and Scranton. Therefore, Bean and Drummond 
concluded that Goldwater's personal vote total was only about 
three million.
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Eisenhower, were able to bring the competing ideological 
factions together without, in the words of columnist David 
Danzig, "undue doctrine or commitment."13 Whatever doubts the 
leading conservative intellectuals had about Goldwater's grasp 
of that particular philosophy, his campaign enabled the 
Republican party to set itself apart from the Democrats. In 
addition, he had brought an infusion of young people and money 
into the G.O.P.
The Republican party was faced with a dilemma. G.O.P. 
officials knew the party could not have Goldwaterites in major 
leadership posts, but their strength was such that they could 
not be drummed out of the party.14 In spite of the nature and 
extent of the recent defeat, both the candidate and the party 
needed to work together. A challenge to Goldwater's authority 
as party leader came immediately following the election, when 
G.O.P. Chairman Dean Burch was pressured to step down. 
Goldwater fought hard in behalf of his friend Burch, but in so 
doing only managed to anger his Republican colleagues more. 
One wrote to say that his continued support of Burch was 
"unfortunate."15 Another stated that Goldwater's
intransigence in this matter was preventing the unity that
13 David Danzig, "Conservatism After Goldwater," Commentary 
39 (March, 1965): 31.
14 Rovere, Goldwater Caper. 176.
15 Maurice Van Nostrand to Goldwater, December 23, 19 64,
Goldwater Papers.
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Republicans needed more than ever.16 Nonetheless, Burch 
resigned and was replaced by Ray Bliss, a man many thought 
would help move the party back toward the political center.
Barry Goldwater further disrupted the party by helping to 
found the Free Society Association (F.S.A.) in June 1965. The 
purpose of this organization, co-founded by former Goldwater 
aides Tony Smith and Karl Hess, was to do "research" for 
conservative causes and continue to keep the right-wing 
involved in the national political process through the 
publishing of "The New Federalist Papers" as well as other 
articles that stressed the conservative political view.17 It 
was also meant to provide an "organizational vehicle" to 
maintain Goldwater's grass-roots control of the Republican 
party delegate selection process in upcoming elections, give 
financial backing to conservative candidates, and keep control 
of money raised by the Goldwater presidential campaign.18
The F.S.A. touched off a controversy within the G.O.P. 
Chairman Bliss thought it would divide the party at a time 
when Republicans needed to "present a unified front to the 
opposition."19 When Goldwater, speaking at an F.S.A.
16 Edward Janeway to Goldwater, January 4, 1965, Goldwater
Papers.
17 Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 111, pt. 
11: 14712.
18 Walter Dean Burnham, "Goldwater Rallies the Troops," 
Commonweal 82 (August 6, 1965): 552.
19 "When Goldwater Launched a New Group," U.S. News and World 
Report 64 (January 29, 1968): 60-3.
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function, criticized the Council of Republican Organizations 
as an attempt to put forth "carbon copies of Democratic Party 
programs," even some of Goldwater's allies were upset, who 
stressed the need to "work within the Republican party."20
Meanwhile, Lyndon Johnson used the magnitude of his 
election victory to push an unprecedented amount of Great 
Society legislation through the Democratically controlled 89th 
Congress. Medicare, the Voting Rights Act, Head Start, and 
environmental beautification acts were only a few of the 
programs to sail through Congress with little Republican 
opposition. The President's policies in regard to foreign 
affairs, specifically military action in the Dominican 
Republic and Vietnam, met with Republican approval. In 1964- 
65 the G.O.P. applauded what they thought were Johnson's 
efforts to fight Communism abroad.21
Now a private citizen (he had given up his Senate seat in 
order to run for President), Goldwater used the Free Society 
Association to assail the liberal colossus of the Great 
Society. In the spring of 1966 he spoke at an F.S.A. rally in 
Chicago and attacked Great Society legislation steamrolling 
through Congress as a "fast-moving, irresponsible 
nationalizing process that can bring only frustration, 
stagnation, loss of individuality and government imposed 
restraints." He accused liberals of shunning rational debate,
20 Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, 111, pt. 
11: 11339,
21 Reinhard, Republican Right. 213, 15.
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charging them with making conservatives "appear bigoted, anti- 
Semitic or just plain stupid" because they happen to espouse 
different points of view.22
By 1966 the Republican party began to show signs of 
unity. Two years earlier the party was on the brink of 
disintegration following the Goldwater election debacle. Now 
the G.O.P. began putting aside its intraparty disputes to 
prepare for the critical off-year election. A decade earlier 
Clinton Rossiter stressed that conservatism must not be "as 
suspicious, gloomy, passive, and elitist as Conservatism in 
other countries; it can and must be more daring, hopeful, 
individualistic, and democratic.1,23 In order to achieve this, 
conservatives needed to join the main body of Republicans to 
help formulate a program of alternatives to liberalism that 
were valid to contemporary life.24 In addition,
"conservatives" must dissociate from extremism and show, in 
the words of George Nash, "intellectual maturity instead of 
factionalism. "25
Barry Goldwater appeared up to the challenge, and put 
aside his penchant for factionalism to join the main body of
leading Republicans. In 19 66 he served as a member of the
\
G.O.P. Coordinating Committee, which included such former
22 New York Times. May 5, 19 66, 20.
23 Buckley, Dream Walking. 91.
24 Rossiter, Conservatism in America. 3 00.
25 Nash, Conservative Intellectual. 2 92.
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Goldwater nemeses as Eisenhower, Nixon, Rockefeller, Dewey, 
and Romney. The purpose of the Committee was to set party 
policy between national elections and to keep abreast of the 
Johnson administration. It supported G.O.P. congressional 
candidates and attacked L.B.J. for the expanding federal 
bureaucracy.26
The 1966 election results showed the greatest Republican 
gains in twenty years. Author David Reinhard called it "the 
key year in the post-World War II history of the Republican 
Right," as many former Goldwater supporters won election over 
their more liberal opponents.27 It was an occasion that 
marked a minor comeback for the Republican party, but perhaps 
more importantly, it also indicated the first tangible sign of 
eroding public support for the Johnson administration.
Arthur Schlesinger, a prominent liberal scholar and 
former Kennedy advisor, wrote that "liberalism" was a 
philosophy that was "humane, experimental and pragmatic; it 
has no sense of messianic mission and no faith that all 
problems have final solutions."28 Lyndon Johnson may well 
have argued differently, as his Great Society increasingly 
made the federal government responsible for the social and 
economic well-being of the citizenry. Programs that had been
26 New York Times. December 13, 1966; Goldwater, With No
Apologies. 200.
27 Reinhard, Republican Right. 216.
28 Schlesinger, The Vital Center (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1962) , xv.
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necessary in the midst of the Great Depression thirty years 
before were by the mid-sixties, in many cases, bloated 
bureaucracies that failed to deliver the assistance they were 
designed to give. People were questioning the continuation—  
and expansion of— social welfare programs under Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson in the midst of economic prosperity. 
Political writer Kevin Phillips commented upon the decline of 
New Deal/Great Society liberalism by pointing out that by the 
mid-1960s "the Democratic Party fell victim to the ideological 
impetus of a liberalism which had carried it beyond programs 
taxing the few for the benefit of the many (the New Deal) to 
programs taxing the many on behalf of the few (the Great 
Society) .1,29
Many whites resented Great Society programs that they 
felt disproportionately aided blacks. "Civil rights" had been 
replaced by "Black Power." Rioting rocked cities during a 
series of "long hot summers," a manifestation of the 
disillusionment blacks felt over the Great Society's failure 
to meet their expectations. When whites fled in ever- 
increasing numbers to the safety of the suburbs, the left- 
leaning influence of the central cities declined. The typical 
suburbanite, said conservative writer M. Stanton Evans, was 
"more concerned about schools, roads, and law enforcement than 
he is about welfare programs, Medicare, and the war on
29 Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New 
Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969), 37.
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poverty. "30
Without Barry Goldwater's verbal recklessness to deflect 
attention from the Democratic administration's record, it had 
to answer directly to the voters. In 1966 many districts 
throughout the country that had gone overwhelmingly Democratic 
two years earlier now voted for the G.O.P. Especially 
dramatic in this respect were precincts in the Southern 
highlands. In 1964 voters there resented Goldwater's open 
collusion with the Deep South; two years later, due to their 
disenchantment with the Great Society and the Vietnam War, 
they voted solidly for Republican candidates.31
Goldwater claimed that the 19 66 election results were a 
reflection of the "dissatisfaction with the candor with which 
this [Johnson] Administration is treating the American people" 
on issues like the economy, crime, and Vietnam.32 Author 
Michael Miles suggested, however, that Barry Goldwater was 
partly responsible for the Great Society that he criticized. 
His 1964 defeat, combined with losses in Congress, had allowed 
L.B.J. to move his programs through with little opposition. 
It was only after these programs began to be discredited by 
their failure to meet popular expectations, along with public 
dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, that the Republican
30 Evans, Future, 34, 36.
31 Phillips, Emerging. 259.
32 "Republican Party Pulled Itself Together," U.S. News and 
World Report 61 (November 11, 1966): 60-1.
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party really gained any momentum.33 Moreover, according to 
Johnson biographer Vaughn Bornet, Goldwater and Johnson had 
agreed not to discuss Vietnam during the 19 64 election, thus 
suppressing national debate earlier in the conflict when the 
U.S. troop commitment was much lower.34 By 1966, however, 
Goldwater heavily criticized Johnson's conduct of a "limited 
war" that placed too many restrictions on enemy targets for 
U.S. pilots without spelling out any specific plan (or 
timetable) for victory.
Interestingly, the primary benefactor of the G.O.P. 
revival was not Goldwater, but Richard Milhous Nixon. Nixon 
had introduced Goldwater at the 1964 G.O.P. convention but 
described himself as being "almost physically sick" upon 
hearing Goldwater's acceptance speech.35 Nonetheless, Nixon 
had campaigned hard for the Goldwater/Miller ticket. He tried 
to be a conciliator between the candidate and the rest of the 
Republican party. Nixon had been disappointed that the 
Goldwater candidacy had brought the "extremist" label upon the 
G.O.P., and later tried to distance himself from the right-
33 Miles, Odyssey, 299.
34 Vaughn Davis Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson 
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1983), 110.
Goldwater could have capitalized on the Vietnam issue during 
the 1964 election, as he felt Johnson was vulnerable to 
criticism stemming from the Kennedy administration's role in 
the murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in
1963. He and Johnson agreed not to discuss the issue out of 
respect for national security and growing domestic unrest.
35 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1989), vol. 2, "The Triumph of a Politician 1962-1972," 54.
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wing by proclaiming, "If being a liberal means federalizing 
everything, then I'm no liberal. If being a conservative 
means turning back the clock, denying problems that exist, 
then I'm no conservative.1136 Like so much else about Richard 
Nixon, his politics were hard to categorize.
Nixon refrained from joining the anti-Goldwater chorus 
that was heard in the wake of the 19 64 election. For this 
Goldwater was very grateful, and as early as January 1965 he 
endorsed Nixon for the 19 68 presidential nomination. 
Optimistic about Republican chances that year, Goldwater 
observed that "if Johnson continues to be the bumbling 
politician he's turning out to be. . .1 think he can be beaten 
in 1968. "37
Goldwater and Nixon endured a long history together in 
national politics. Goldwater was elected to the Senate the 
same year Nixon became Vice-President. By the 1960s Goldwater 
had come to believe that Nixon was a duplicitous politician 
who lacked a firm commitment to conservative principles. An 
example was Nixon's appeasement of Nelson Rockefeller in 1960. 
Despite Goldwater's concerns about Nixon's character, however, 
he still did his best to further Nixon's quest for the 
presidency.
After his 1960 presidential defeat and his humiliating 
loss in the California gubernatorial race two years later,
36 Reichley, Age of Change. 53.
37 "How Goldwater Views 1968 and 1964," U.S. News and World 
Report 61 (September 12, 1966): 22.
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Nixon briefly retired from public life. By 1964, however, he 
had returned to the political arena and over the vext few 
years he carefully accumulated considerable political capital. 
In addition to stumping for Goldwater in 19 64 when other party 
members treated the candidate like a political pariah, Nixon 
went out on the hustings for Republican candidates again in 
1966. That year Nixon campaigned only for candidates in 
districts where the G.O.P. had lost close races in 1964. That 
way he could claim much of the credit for single-handedly 
reversing the Goldwater debacle, even though many seats would 
have returned to the Republican party without Nixon's help. 
He wrote a form letter to previously defeated candidates 
reminding them that it was "the drag on the top of the ticket" 
in 1964 that kept them from winning.38 By 19 68 he had amassed 
enough political clout to make another credible run for the 
presidency.
The man who suffered the most as a result of Nixon's 
resurrection was probably the most vigorous advocate of 
Goldwater conservatism since 1964, California Governor Ronald 
Reagan. Reagan's star had risen as a result of a 19 64 
campaign commercial promoting Goldwater. His explanation of 
Goldwater's principles was so thorough and articulate— much 
more so than the candidate's clumsy attempts to clarify his 
own positions— that party members instantly saw him as a 
potentially big political winner in his own right. After
38 Ambrose, Nixon, vol. 2, 60, 81.
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winning the California governorship in 19 66 Reagan was 
considered presidential timber. In fact, the Young Americans 
for Freedom had shifted their allegiance to Reagan for the 
presidency at a time when Goldwater himself was calling for 
Nixon.39 Of course, Goldwater, too, acknowledged Reagan as a 
political comer; he thought a Nixon/Reagan ticket in 1968 
would be most attractive, but stuck with Nixon for the top 
spot because, first and foremost, "Nixon was a party man" and 
second, because he had allegedly been assured by Reagan that 
the latter was not going to be a candidate.40
Ironically, Goldwater's defeat in 1964 had undermined a 
Reagan candidacy four years later due to the party's 
inevitable move toward the center following such a loss. 
Right-wing victories in Congress were one thing, but the 
viability of yet another right-wing candidate for the 
presidency was another matter. Besides, Reagan, as a relative 
newcomer to politics, had not accumulated enough party service 
to assure nomination, and this was probably the main reason 
why Goldwater preferred the more experienced Nixon.41
Goldwater's support of Nixon was important to the future 
of the right-wing, because the majority of delegates were the 
same people who had nominated the Arizona Senator himself four 
years earlier. This was confirmed by Edward P. Morgan of the
39 New York Times. September 2, 1967, 10.
40 New York Times. July 21, 1967, 14; October 2, 1967, 17.
41 Kolkey, New Right. 2 61.
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A.F.L./C.I.O. News. who claimed that the G.O.P. was still in 
the hands of grass-roots operators who "lack political vision 
or experience, and who only see government as the enemy."42 
These delegates came into the party as Goldwater supporters; 
their political champion still carried a lot of weight in the 
G.O.P. However, Nixon's hawkish approach to Vietnam 
compensated for his moderate domestic views in the eyes of 
many in the G.O.P. right. Nixon said of Goldwater supporters 
that "they don't like me, but they tolerate me."43
One thing Goldwater made clear was that he was not about 
to support anyone who had turned his back on the ticket in
1964. This threat was aimed primarily at his intraparty 
nemesis, Nelson Rockefeller. Early in 1968 Goldwater made 
news when he proclaimed that "I and my fellow Conservatives of 
the Republican party want no part of Rockefeller as a 
candidate."44 Personal feelings aside, Goldwater's reasons 
for not endorsing a Rockefeller candidacy were twofold. 
First, he felt he would alienate voters in Arizona at a time 
when he was seeking re-election to the Senate. Second, 
Goldwater's endorsement of the New York Governor would 
undermine his own strength nationally, as it would draw the 
wrath of his grass-roots supporters who still clung to power 
at local and state levels. In sum, Rockefeller would split
42 Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, 112, pt. 
19: 26121.
43 Ambrose, Nixon, vol. 2, 61.
44 New York Times. March 5, 1968, 25.
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the party and lose, because the G.O.P. still had very powerful 
bastions of Goldwaterite strength that were holdovers from 
1964 .45
At the Republican National Convention in 1968 Goldwater 
worked hard for Nixon and was instrumental in keeping Southern 
delegations in the Nixon fold. When it looked briefly as 
though Nixon might not get the nomination on the first ballot, 
Goldwater falsely announced that Ronald Reagan would release 
his delegates in exchange for the Vice-Presidential spot on 
the ticket, even though Reagan had already said he was not 
interested in the post.46 In a speech to the convention 
Goldwater pleaded for party unity— the kind he could not 
achieve four years earlier— by saying that "we are not here to 
accuse and we are not here to divide," but, rather, "we are 
here to deliver a message to the future and to find a meaning 
for today."47 Goldwater courted black support for the G.O.P., 
saying that "they have had enough of the promises of politics. 
They want a piece of the action. They must have it," and 
claimed that thirty years of unchecked liberal welfare statism 
had done little to further their fight for civil and economic
45 New York Times. January 16, 1968, 38. Goldwater was forced 
to back down from his anti-Rockefeller stand in the name of 
party unity, and the next day issued a retraction of his 
comments, claiming that if certain (unnamed) candidates want 
to convince him of their commitment to conservative principles 
as important Republican ideals, "I can be convinced." New 
York Times. March 6, 1968, 33.
46 Kolkey, New Right. 283.
47 New York Times. August 6, 1968, 20.
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equality. He stressed that "people power" and individual 
freedom were superior to "government power" and nameless 
numbers in a federal bureaucracy.48
By supporting Nixon, Goldwater became concerned about the 
third party candidacy of Alabama Governor George Wallace. 
Wallace had stayed out of the 1964 race when Goldwater 
received the nomination, and although Goldwater and Wallace 
shared a number of views, namely "law and order" and a hard­
line approach to Communism, the former believed that Wallace 
had "absolutely no chance" of winning. Votes that would 
otherwise go to Nixon would "go right down a rat hole" in a 
futile Wallace vote. The result would ensure a victory for 
Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey. Moreover, Goldwater 
believed that a Wallace candidacy would disrupt the two-party 
system, and such a fissure would pave the way for the type of 
ineffective coalition government that was practiced in Europe. 
Such a scenario was, of course, unlikely, but more to the 
point, Goldwater wanted to make his constituency loyal to the 
Republican party. If G.O.P. conservatives were unhappy, they 
should stay and work out their problems within the party. 
Splintering would make conservatism, and the party as a whole, 
weaker, while making the Democrats stronger.49 No matter that 
Wallace was probably more ideologically aligned with the
48 Congressional Record. 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, vol. 114, 
pt. 20: 25873-4.
49 Barry Goldwater, "Don't Waste a Vote on Wallace," National 
Review 20 (October 22, 1968): 1060-1, 1079.
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Arizona Senator than Nixon ever was. Allegiance to the party 
came first. "I am not a sometime Republican," Goldwater 
proclaimed in early 1968, and it was with his emphasis on 
party unity that Nixon was able to overcome Wallace's 
independent presidential bid that year.50
Nixon's narrow triumph over Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey in November 1968 confirmed the success of a strategy 
initiated by the Goldwater campaign four years earlier: the
South was the key to a Republican presidential victory. Even 
though George Wallace carried a few states in the Deep South, 
Nixon made significant inroads in that region to make his 
victory possible. The South was important because it was 
gaining population and, thus, in political power. In contrast 
the Northeast, long the bastion of liberal Democrats and 
progressive Republicans, was declining in population and 
influence. Even though Nixon himself supported the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and opposed segregation, Goldwater's convention 
tactics, along with support from Southern Senators John Tower 
and Strom Thurmond, were instrumental in keeping the South in 
his camp.51
After such an overwhelming defeat just four years 
earlier, the Republican party's comeback was only slightly 
less amazing than that of Richard Nixon's. Barry Goldwater, 
far from being banished to political oblivion following his
50 New York Times. March 5, 1968, 22.
51 Evans, Future, x, xii, xiii, 256-7; Phillips, Emerging, 42.
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own defeat, had used his considerable leverage to rally the 
party to victory behind Nixon. In so doing he had managed to 
convince his own supporters— the legions of people that had 
joined the G.O.P. as Goldwaterites— that loyalty to party was 
just as important as loyalty to a particular faction. Indeed, 
in tracing his evolution over the previous four years, this is 
a lesson that he himself seemed to learn above all else.
The glow of triumph was to fade all too quickly, however. 
Despite having doubts about his character, Goldwater had been 
instrumental in electing Richard Nixon President of the United 
States. In this endeavor he eschewed other candidates whose 
viewpoints more closely matched his own for a number of 
reasons: party unity, personal gratitude for previous
support, and Nixon's previous political experience. Despite 
all things, Goldwater believed that now the federal government 
could be overhauled into a more conservative instrument of 
policy, and Nixon had courted conservatives to the extent that 
they felt comfortable he could accomplish such a task. For 
all the Arizonan's hopes, nonetheless, Richard Nixon turned 
out to be an embarrassment to Goldwater, the Republican party, 
and conservatism. Recollecting years hence, Goldwater stated 
bitterly, "perhaps I expected too much."52
52 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 2 09.
CHAPTER III
"HE WAS THE MOST DISHONEST INDIVIDUAL 
I EVER MET IN MY LIFE
Richard Nixon seemed, on the surface at least, eminently 
qualified for the office of President of the United States. 
He had been elected to the House of Representatives in 1946, 
to the Senate in 1950, and had served two terms as 
Eisenhower's Vice-President. His losses to John Kennedy for 
the presidency in 1960 and to Edmund "Pat" Brown for the 
governorship of California in 1962 appeared to end his 
political career, but he returned to the spotlight in 1964 by 
supporting Barry Goldwater's presidential candidacy when other 
prominent Republicans— Rockefeller, Romney, and Scranton among 
them— had disavowed the Arizona Senator's campaign. This 
effort was not forgotten by either Goldwater or his 
supporters. Nixon's similar show of support for Republican 
congressional candidates in 1966 (many of whom were 
Goldwaterites) earned him renewed respect within the G.O.P. as 
a loyal party man. He was also a man to whom many political 
favors were owed, and he redeemed them by getting solid 
support from the G.O.P. right (Barry Goldwater chief among 
them) for his presidential run in 1968.
Nixon was not, however, a Goldwater conservative. He was
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pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. The Nixon administration, 
at least in part, accepted the expansion of government 
responsibly as evolved from the New Deal, which the President 
himself advanced during his first term in areas like the 
environment and federal spending for social welfare programs. 
Nixon thought the New Frontier and the Great Society had good 
intentions, but their bureaucracy, in the words of James 
Reichley, "undermined fundamental relationships within our 
federal system."1 Nixon sought to enhance local and state 
control of many of those agencies. Although he wanted to get 
rid of the many Kennedy/Johnson holdovers in the federal 
government, Nixon remained in favor of the social progress the 
New Frontier/Great Society agencies presumably stood for. One 
notable difference between him and his predecessors, however, 
was that Nixon often refrained from using the federal 
government to enforce civil rights.2
Goldwater, who had successfully regained his Senate seat 
in 1968, publicly supported the President, but privately he 
had many concerns over the way Nixon was dealing with 
important matters of state. The Senator felt that Nixon was 
paying too little attention to domestic affairs, particularly 
the economy. Goldwater was troubled that the President had 
imposed wage and price controls in 1971, something Nixon said 
he would never do. Nixon was also moving too slowly in
1 Reichley, Age of Change. 50-1, 169, 409.
2 Reg Murphy and Hal Gulliver, The Southern Strategy (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 22.
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removing the J.F.K./L.B.J. holdovers from government 
positions, an alarming fact that was compounded by Nixon's 
addition of several Democrats to top administration positions. 
Among them were Henry Kissinger, a former Kennedy consultant 
who became National Security Advisor (later Secretary of 
State), and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, selected to be a domestic 
affairs advisor.3 Nevertheless, Goldwater publicly supported 
his President, even to the extent of admonishing those on the 
Republican right who were criticizing Nixon's actions: "Let
me ask you what you have to offer in his place."4
Privately, however, Goldwater had very serious concerns 
about the administration's performance. He tried to convey to 
Nixon what his constituents in Arizona were telling him; they 
wanted lower taxes, less federal spending, and less government 
interference. But Nixon remained aloof from any suggestions 
Goldwater offered. "I got the impression that he thought that 
Arizona was atypical and that I was too blunt and too positive 
in my opinions," Goldwater wrote later.5 Indeed, even 
getting an appointment with the President was often an 
exercise in futility, for a wall of isolation had been erected 
around Nixon by his two top aides, H.R. Haldeman and John 
Ehrlichman, a wall, Goldwater believed, that could not have
3 Goldwater, Goldwater. 257-9. Reinhard, Republican Right.
222 .
4 "How Goldwater Sees It," National Review 2 3 (September 24, 
1971): 27.
5 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 215.
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been built without Nixon's "knowledge and approval."6
By 1971, an uncomfortable friction had arisen between 
Nixon and Goldwater fueled in part by the former's apparent 
lack of direction. That year Goldwater supported Senator Hugh 
Scott's reelection as minority leader at the request of the 
President, even though the Arizona Senator felt that Scott was 
too closely allied with liberals in matters like government 
spending. Later Nixon wanted Scott dumped in favor of Howard 
Baker. Goldwater had wanted Baker from the start, but said to 
Nixon that the commitments for keeping Scott had already been 
made.7
Nineteen-seventy-one was also the year that Nixon 
announced his support for the Family Assistance Plan, a 
welfare reform proposal that gave a guaranteed income to 
qualified families. This program was vigorously promoted by 
Moynihan. James Reichley speculated that Nixon supported the 
measure because he identified with the working poor from his 
own childhood experience of having grown up as the son of a 
poor lemon farmer in California.8 Nonetheless, the plan, 
together with a growing budget deficit and the imposition of 
wage and price controls, became symbolic of the alleged 
"leftward drift" of the administration, and only helped 
alienate Nixon further from the conservative Republican
6 Goldwater, Goldwater. 257-9.
7 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 215. Apparently Nixon feared 
Scott would line up congressional support against him in 1972.
8 Reichley, Age of Chancre. 138-43.
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constituency that was vital to his election. Still, Goldwater 
continued to maintain his silence, perhaps fearing a 
resurgence of intraparty fighting that characterized the 
G.O.P. in 1964.9
Barry Goldwater greeted the Nixon Administration's 
handling of foreign policy with mixed emotions. He praised 
Nixon for being the first President to begin bringing home 
ground forces from Vietnam, calling his progress "a remarkably 
fine job."10 He showed concern, however, for Nixon's 
initiation of detente with the Soviet Union. Any negotiation 
with the U.S.S.R., Goldwater felt, amounted to de-facto 
acceptance of the Communist doctrine and the current state of 
affairs in Eastern Europe.11 Nixon was still an anti­
communist, but he knew the American people were growing tired 
of the sacrifices needed to keep Communism at bay. He 
realized, however, that the Communist states of China and the 
Soviet Union could be used against each other. Thus, in his 
relations with the Soviet Union and China Nixon pursued a 
conciliatory yet not altruistic approach. Goldwater was well 
aware of the potential impact the Sino-Soviet split could have 
on U.S. security but, according to Reichley, he did not favor 
cutting military spending, and he would have proceeded much 
more slowly than Nixon, since he still assumed that Communism
9 Reinhard, Republican Right. 22 5.
10 Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, vol.
115, pt 22: 29568.
11 Reinhard, Republican Right. 223.
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had hegemonic ambitions.12
Goldwater was particularly disturbed about Nixon's 
overture toward formal relations with China. Even though on 
the Senate floor he supported Nixon, stating that there was 
"nothing devious or evil" in the President's visit to China, 
privately it took repeated assurances from Henry Kissinger to 
convince Goldwater that negotiations with China were in 
America's best interests. The Senator objected to the 
possibility of China's admission to the United Nations, which 
he prophesied would be "a serious blow to that 
organization."13 It was the future of the democratic
government in Taiwan, however, that most concerned Goldwater. 
Republican conservatives had threatened to abandon Nixon 
should any harm come to Taiwan's government as a result of 
agreements struck with the Chinese. When the Shanghai 
Communique was released reaffirming China's sovereignty over 
Taiwan and ordered United States troop withdrawals from it, 
Goldwater surprisingly continued to support the 
administration, citing assurances he had received from Nixon 
and Kissinger about the long-range survival of the island. 
This attitude was "utterly mystifying" to William F. Buckley, 
who had consistently been one of Goldwater's staunchest 
defenders. In The National Review Buckley castigated 
Goldwater for his response to the Communique, saying it was
12 Reichley, Age of Change. 106, 129.
13 Congressional Record. 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, vol. 117, 
pt. 27: 34991-2.
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"bad enough to lose Taiwan. The prospect of losing Barry 
Goldwater is insupportable, and terribly, shatteringly sad."14 
For the sake of party unity, Goldwater kept his own objections 
to himself. Later, he admitted feeling betrayed by the 
Administration. In his personal diary he confessed, "If I 
cannot believe my President, then I have lost all my faith in 
men, friends, and in my country's leadership."15
The advice Goldwater gave to the President just prior to 
the 1972 election was to stay at home and "be presidential, 
and pursue an honorable peace in Vietnam."16 The Senator made 
about a dozen appearances in support of the national ticket. 
After Nixon's overwhelming defeat of Democrat George McGovern, 
Goldwater met with the President at Camp David. At that time 
he stressed that given such an electoral mandate, Nixon should 
"take full control of the federal government."17 In other 
meetings the Senator suggested that Nixon restructure the 
armed forces to allow for more efficiency and less competition 
among the four branches.
Nixon wrote in his memoirs that he had originally planned 
his second term to be responsible for "having advocated the 
most significant reforms of any administration since that of 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932." What he envisioned, however, was
14 William F. Buckley, "Senator Goldwater's Reassurance," 
National Review vol. 24, pt. 1 (March 31, 1972): 365.
15 Goldwater, Goldwater, 2 59.
16 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 246, 2 47.
17 Ibid., 248; Reichley, Age of Change. 227.
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quite different than the New Deal. Rather, Nixon wanted to 
reverse the agglomeration of government power, thus making it 
"leaner" yet "stronger."18 The President promised Goldwater 
he would trim the governmental bureaucracy, get rid of the 
Kennedy/Johnson appointees, and reorganize the State 
Department, all of which he hesitated to do in his first term 
because the narrowness of his 1968 victory prevented him from 
confronting an entrenched Democratic congress.19 Goldwater 
later believed that it was, in fact, the closeness of that 
election that led the Nixon administration to commit the 
political "excesses" in the 1972 contest, excesses that 
ultimately led to the exposure of the Watergate scandal and 
the destruction of the Nixon presidency.20
Goldwater's role during the Watergate crisis defies easy 
explanation. On the one hand, he urged the President from the 
very beginning to tell the truth about the affair. The longer 
Nixon delayed in doing that, the more the crisis would damage 
not only the reputation of the Republican party, but, more 
importantly, the ability of the government to function 
effectively both domestically and internationally. On the 
other hand, Goldwater consistently supported Nixon on the 
Senate floor, believing until the last minute that, despite 
the President's shoddy handling of the affair, he was innocent
18 Richard Nixon, R.N. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New 
York: Warner Brothers, 1978), vol. 2, 275.
19 Ibid., 276.
20 Goldwater, Goldwater. 2 61.
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of the most serious charges. This attitude led writer Peter 
Steinfels to label the Senator's criticism of Nixon's actions 
"tactical, not fundamental."21
The Nixon administration had managed to avoid major media 
exposure of the Watergate burglary until after the 1972 
election, but by January 1973, it had started to receive 
increasing attention in the press. Barry Goldwater was one of 
the first members of the Republican party to express concern 
over the affair, citing its potential impact on the national 
elections in 1974 and 1976. Nonetheless, the Senator strongly 
believed Nixon himself "knew nothing at all about any matter 
in relation to the so-called Watergate affair. I believe he 
is completely honest."22 Recalling his time as a presidential 
candidate, Goldwater stated that he was often unaware of his 
subordinates' activities. Still, Goldwater was upset that the 
President was not taking any steps to publicly clear-up the 
growing scandal within his administration. "Its beginning to 
smell like Teapot Dome," Goldwater exclaimed in April 1973 .23
His support of Nixon personally notwithstanding, 
Goldwater co-sponsored a resolution in May 197 3 calling on the 
President to appoint a special prosecutor to handle the case. 
He later called Nixon's selection of Archibald Cox to the post
21 Peter Steinfels, "The Goldwater Myth," Commonweal 99 
(February 1, 1974): 431.
22 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119, pt. 
11: 13722.
23 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1991), vol. 3 "Ruin and Recovery 1973-1990," 101-2.
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"politically stupid." Cox, in the Senator's mind, was an 
unabashed liberal who was too partisan in his staff selection. 
Goldwater maintained that "Nixon had to fire him."24 In an 
attempt to block release of certain tapes of White House 
discussions, Nixon finally ordered Cox dismissed On October 
20, 1973. Refusing to do Nixon's dirty work, Attorney
General Elliot Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, 
resigned to protest. Following this incident, known as the 
Saturday Night Massacre, Goldwater feared that "the 
possibility of determining the truth of Watergate was lost 
forever.1,25
Goldwater first addressed the possibility of resignation 
or impeachment in an interview with Time in the late spring of 
1973. While the Senator maintained that he was satisfied that 
the President "knew nothing at the inception" of the Watergate 
burglary, he was not so sure that Nixon was innocent of 
covering up the affair. "If he didn't lie he'll probably be 
O.K.," but if he were lying about his involvement, impeachment 
would be likely, and resignation almost a certainty. "There 
ought to be a complete clarification. . . . Everything out.
Right now," Goldwater stated.26
Not long after this interview, Goldwater accused the 
press of showing a lack of concern for national security in
24 Goldwater, Goldwater. 262.
25 Ibid., 262.
26 Hays Gorey, "Goldwater on Nixon's Prospects," Time 101 (May 
28, 1973): 19.
66
its Watergate coverage, citing as examples the New York Times 
and the Washington Post. To support this assertion, Goldwater 
pointed out that in 1962, when the Saturday Evening Post 
published excerpts from National Security Council meetings, 
both the Times and the Post denounced the "breach of 
security." Under the current crisis, however, Daniel Ellsberg 
was portrayed as a hero for leaking the Pentagon Papers to the 
press. The disregard for national security was compounded by 
what Goldwater viewed as a liberal-leaning bias within the 
national media.27
Such an accusation was understandable, considering the 
treatment he was given by the press during the course of his 
own political career. His outburst over this issue was 
ironic, however, since in the early 1970s Barry Goldwater 
gained a newfound respectability in the eyes of many in the 
national press and broadcast media. No less a figure than 
Walter Cronkite commented that Goldwater, previously 
"ridiculed as an anachronism," was now a well-respected 
statesman who was "the voice of moderation and reason" during 
the Watergate crisis due to his penchant for putting honesty 
and integrity above partisan politics.28 Some writers saw 
evidence in the Pentagon Papers, released two years earlier, 
that tended to support Goldwater's earlier positions. In
27 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119, pt. 
14: 18008.
28 William F. Buckley, "Tribute to Goldwater," National Review 
25 (November 9, 1973): 1265.
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1971, a journalist for Roll Call claimed that the Papers 
showed that Goldwater was right in saying that L.B.J. had 
increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1965, even though 
Johnson said he would never do such a thing in his 1964 
presidential campaign. Goldwater was hawkish but truthful, 
while Johnson deceitfully portrayed himself as a man of peace. 
The writer observed that "only Barry Goldwater emerges from 
these Pentagon Papers as an honest man. It is indeed ironic 
to see the newspapers which once sought to destroy him now 
admit that in a cynical age he was a man who told the 
truth. "29
By June of 197 3 Barry Goldwater was becoming very alarmed 
about President Nixon's lack of leadership. On the fifth of 
that month he personally typed a letter to the President 
criticizing him for his continued isolation, for his failure 
to resolve the Watergate crisis, and for his lack of G.O.P. 
leadership. He reminded Nixon that "you are the leader of the 
party and you have to act like it."30 Five weeks later Nixon 
assistant Bryce Harlow called on Goldwater to ask for advice 
on what the President should do. The Senator replied that 
Nixon should appear as a witness before the Senate Watergate 
Committee. On the Senate floor, however, Goldwater
contradicted himself, claiming that the President had the 
right to "handle the Watergate charges in whatever manner he
29 Congressional Record. 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, 117, pt. 
17: 22564-5.
30 Goldwater, Goldwater. 2 61-5.
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chooses." He claimed that there was a precedent for Nixon's 
refusal to personally appear before the committee: President
Johnson had refused to testify before Congress over an issue 
concerning one of his former staff members. Goldwater 
evidently supported Nixon's actions to the extent that he had 
a newspaper editorial inserted into the Congressional Record 
declaring that the President of the United States should not 
have to "submit to the extralegal processes that are used in 
congressional committee hearings."31 Publicly, at least, 
Senator Goldwater still supported the integrity of President 
Nixon.
On October 10, 1973 Watergate was temporarily
overshadowed by the resignation of Vice-President Spiro T. 
Agnew, who faced several charges of conspiracy, extortion, and 
bribery and who pleaded nolo contendre to a charge of income 
tax evasion. The Agnew scandal was particularly troubling to 
Goldwater because of the way in which it was handled by the 
White House. In his memoirs the Senator accused Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman of leaking damning allegations against the Vice- 
President in order to take the glare off of Watergate, perhaps 
believing that Agnew's resignation might persuade critics that 
the Administration had suffered enough. Moreover, Nixon had 
refused to meet with Agnew to hear his side of the story after 
allegations against the latter were made public.32 Nixon,
31 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119, pt. 
19: 24881; Goldwater, With No Apologies. 254.
32 Goldwater, Goldwater. 2 61-5.
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writing later, claimed that he was sympathetic to Agnew but 
did not see any way that he could help him. He stated, quite 
accurately, that "anything we did to try to help might. . .be 
made to appear that we were trying to cover up for him."33
Goldwater's personal opinion of Agnew was uncompromising. 
If the Vice-President were to be indicted, Goldwater believed 
he should step down. But Goldwater was troubled by the 
handling of the case. He felt that the Vice-President should 
have been charged formally before he was tried in the press.34 
The whole affair, nonetheless, left the Senator rather bitter, 
as he observed that it was "a case study in the contradictory 
nature of Richard Nixon. He quickly deserted Agnew while 
asking me and millions of other Americans not to flee him in 
his hours of trial and torment."35
The selection of a new Vice-President of impeccable 
personal and political credentials was vital, considering the 
magnitude of the Watergate crisis by the fall of 1973. 
Nixon's first choice for a replacement was former Texas 
Governor John B. Connally. Connally had served briefly as 
Secretary of the Treasury during Nixon's first term and was a 
man well qualified to hold the office vacated by Agnew, but 
Goldwater warned the President against the nomination. As a 
newcomer to the G.O.P., Connally would be opposed by many
33 Nixon, Memoirs. 344.
34 "In His Heart He Knows He's Right,1 Newsweek 82 (October 
1, 1973): 29.
35 Goldwater, Goldwater. 2 65.
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within the party, particularly the right-wing, who found his 
conservative credentials suspect. Democrats, too, would 
probably line up against him because of his switch in party 
affiliation.36 Goldwater personally favored either Ronald 
Reagan or Republican Party Chairman George Bush for the job, 
but he was satisfied with the selection of House Minority 
Leader Gerald Ford.37 Ford, who had served in Congress for 
over twenty-five years, had Republican tendencies in the mold 
of Robert Taft, but was more internationalist. He had 
unenthusiastically supported the Goldwater ticket in 1964. 
Ford once claimed that "conservatism has always meant more to 
me than simply sticking up for private property and free 
enterprise. It has also meant defending our heritage and 
preserving our values."38 Goldwater himself claimed that he 
did not want the vice-presidency, "but I would have taken it." 
Nixon, apparently, never asked him.39
Following the departure of Spiro Agnew and the Saturday 
Night Massacre, the call for either impeachment or resignation 
began to be heard more frequently in both Congress and the 
press, but Goldwater still publicly gave Nixon the benefit of 
the doubt. He thought such actions were premature, since it 
would "cause a partisan nightmare of unbelievable
36 Reichley, Age of Change. 282.
37 Goldwater, With No Apologies. 263.
38 Reichley, Age of Change. 22-6, 286.
39 New York Times. October 17, 1973, 35.
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proportions." With Congress stalling in the confirmation of 
Gerald Ford, a Nixon resignation at that time would have 
resulted in House Speaker Carl Albert, a Democrat, becoming 
President. Goldwater speculated that this was precisely what 
the Democrats in Congress were trying to achieve. He implored 
the Democratic leadership to put and end to the partisan 
fighting over Watergate so that Congress could turn its 
attention to more pressing domestic problems like the economy 
and the energy crisis.40
Goldwater's public defense of Nixon continued on into 
1974. Appearing on "Meet the Press" in January he claimed 
that the public had "forgotten Watergate" and was focused on 
more serious problems. He dismissed Nixon's dismal public 
approval rating of twenty-nine percent by pointing out that 
Harry Truman suffered a similar lack of public confidence, yet 
was "probably the best President we had this century."41 In 
regard to the White House tapes that could implicate the 
President's involvement in the Watergate cover-up, Goldwater 
cited reasons of national security in supporting Nixon's right 
to offer only "edited transcripts" of them rather than to obey 
a Congressional subpoena for the tapes themselves. He 
asserted that he "would follow the same procedure" under 
similar circumstances. As late as July 1974 the Senator
40 "Some Republicans Want Nixon to Quit," U.S. News and World 
Report 75 (December 31, 1973): 26.
41 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 120, pt. 
1: 37.
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proclaimed that Watergate was "being blown out of all 
proportion as a news story" at a time "when this nation is 
desperately in need of . . .legislation to handle more urgent 
problems. "42
By the end of that July, Senator Goldwater began to feel 
differently toward Nixon's responsibility in the Watergate 
scandal. On the twelfth of that month, the House Judiciary 
committee released thousands of pages of evidence gleaned from 
the tape transcripts. Although the June 23, 1972 tape— the
one clearly establishing Nixon's role in the Watergate cover- 
up— had yet to surface, it was clear by that point that Nixon 
had been involved. As the Committee voted to bring three 
articles of impeachment against the President, Goldwater 
conceded that the federal government "would be at a standstill 
unless and until [Nixon] left office."43
The Supreme Court finally ordered Nixon to relinquish the 
tapes in United States v. Nixon on July 24, 1974. On August 
5th Dean Burch, the former Republican Party Chairman and now 
White House staffer, handed Goldwater a two-page statement 
scheduled for that afternoon's release confirming Nixon's role 
in the Watergate cover-up. It was at that moment what little 
faith Barry Goldwater had in Richard Nixon was shattered. 
Although he said that he preferred the President to resign, 
Goldwater decided that he would vote to convict Nixon if
42 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 120, pt. 
18: 23498.
43 Goldwater, Goldwater. 274.
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called upon to do so in an impeachment proceeding, which the 
Senator now thought would be eminent.44
Regardless of his personal feelings for Richard Nixon, 
Goldwater was determined to see the President of the United 
States receive a fair trial in Congress. That same day, he 
had an excerpt of Judge Alexander Simpson, Jr.'s Federal 
Impeachments inserted into the Congressional Record. This 
book examined the rules of impeachment proceedings based upon 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and English common law. 
It also set forth the legal precedents emanating from 
President Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial in 1868. The 
Senator stressed that Nixon's rights in an impeachment trial 
were the same as those delegated to him in a regular criminal 
trial, and admonished the Senate to "adhere to principles of 
fairness and justice." He argued that the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, as presiding officer of an impeachment 
trial, should be able to vote on matters of evidence and 
procedure so as to not make the President unduly dependent 
upon the whims of Congress. Also, as a national security 
precaution, television cameras should be barred from the 
Senate chamber during the proceedings.45
On August 6th, after a high-level G.O.P. policy meeting, 
party leaders decided it would be necessary for Goldwater to
Theodore H. White, Breach of Faith (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., 1975), 34.
45 Congressional Record. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 120, pt. 
20: 26658, 26894-5.
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go to the White House to impress upon the embattled President 
his dire situation. The Senator had been asked several times 
over the previous few months to "talk" to Nixon, but had 
always refused, claiming that it was not his place to tell the 
President of the United States anything. Now, however, he 
felt the time had come to confront Nixon directly, and so the 
following day Goldwater, along with Senate Minority Leader 
Hugh Scott and House Minority Leader John Rhodes, met with him 
in the Oval Office. Goldwater was particularly concerned that 
the President was underestimating the gravity of the situation 
and the problems that would arise, both domestically and 
internationally, from his continuation in office. However, 
Goldwater and his colleagues had to give the impression that 
Nixon alone was responsible for decisions regarding the future 
of his presidency. It must not appear that the congressional 
leadership was trying to force Nixon out of the White House. 
Nevertheless, they had to make it clear to the President how 
futile it would be for him to fight on. When Nixon asked him 
how many Senate votes he could expect in the event of an 
impeachment trial, Goldwater replied, "ten at most, maybe 
less." Moreover, the Senator made it clear that he personally 
was leaning toward voting for conviction on Article II: abuse
of power.46
46 Goldwater, Goldwater. 2 79. Goldwater claimed to have 
slightly exaggerated the lack of Senate support for the 
President, but felt he had to make the futility of Nixon's 
situation clear in order to dissuade him from fighting on. 
Also Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), 413-6.
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Following their meeting with Nixon, Goldwater, Scott, and 
Rhodes met with reporters, but they gave only vague details 
about their conversation. Later, Goldwater phoned Katherine 
Graham, owner of the Washington Post, and pleaded with her not 
to print any provocative statements that might persuade the 
President to fight on; simply let Nixon resign without 
reinforcing the fact that he was politically finished. To 
Goldwater's relief, Graham acquiesced.47 Nixon announced his 
resignation to a national television audience the next 
evening, August 8th, with his departure from office to 
formally occur at noon the following day, August 9th, 1974. 
Reflecting years later over the whole ordeal, Barry Goldwater 
wrote in his memoirs that Richard Nixon was "the most 
dishonest individual I ever met in my life." Assessing his 
own role during Watergate, Goldwater recalled that, "my 
concern was for the nation . . . not the President. I knew
that unless public confidence could be restored. . .our almost 
200 years of effort to create the mechanisms to recognize and 
preserve the freedom of the individual would be 
jeopardized. "48
In retrospect, it appears that the presidency of Richard 
Nixon was one of the worst things that could have occurred for 
conservatives of the Goldwater persuation. According to 
Jonathan Kolkey, Nixon's administration, far from reorienting
47 Ibid., 279.
48 Ibid., 2 80; Goldwater, With No Apologies. 2 63.
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government away from the New Deal/New Frontier/Great Society 
liberalism of the previous thirty years, closely resembled the 
moderate, internationalist status-quo presidency of Dwight 
Eisenhower. Many of the social welfare programs enacted 
during the previous Democratic administrations remained 
largely intact, and inflation and the federal deficit grew.49 
Worse yet, James Reichley accused Nixon of manipulating 
conservative principles toward their basest interpretations in 
order to ensure his own political survival. Nixon's call for 
"law and order" in particular, often undermined human 
liberties to maintain order. Executive misuse of federal 
agencies to harass political enemies and lax enforcement of 
civil rights laws were just a few of many instances of such 
behavior. And although conservatism did not cause Watergate, 
Reichley maintained, the episode "represented the failure of 
conservatism, because Nixon. . .largely drew on conservative 
precepts. . .to rationalize [his] tactics."50
Nixon biographer Stephen Ambrose commented upon the irony 
of the Nixon administration's failure in regard to 
conservative fortunes. His presidency did little to stem the 
liberalism that had flowered since the New Deal era. While 
Watergate "discredited Nixon," it also dealt a blow to the 
G.O.P. "middle ground" he had occupied between Rockefeller and 
Goldwater. Conservatives like Barry Goldwater and William F.
49 Kolkey, New Right.
50 Reichley, Age of Change. 260-1.
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Buckley felt free to criticize his policies, and the 
Republican party underwent a shift to the right that 
culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.51 None 
of this, however, was immediately apparent in 1974.
Many critics questioned Goldwater's public role during 
the Watergate crisis. Commonweal writer Peter Steinfels 
observed that while Goldwater urged Nixon to be candid, he 
still— until the last possible moment— publicly proclaimed the 
President's innocence, just as he had done for Senator Joseph 
McCarthy twenty years before. Jonathan Kolkey thought this 
demonstrated a supreme lack of political judgement on 
Goldwater's part. This display of "monumental political 
stupidity" was the most glaring example of how Goldwater and 
his followers "succeeded in disgracing their own movement."52
51 Ambrose, Nixon. 596.
52 Kolkey, New Right. 297, 298, 301.
CONCLUSION
Barry Goldwater was not an insignificant man in American 
political history. Theodore White has suggested that losing 
candidates often bring as much relevance to political dialogue 
as the winners, citing Adlai Stevenson as an example. To 
compare Goldwater with Stevenson, however, or to more obscure 
men like John W. Davis, is not accurate. White speculated 
that Goldwater's closest historical counterpart was William 
Jennings Bryan, who spoke with equal vigor about equally 
preposterous policies. Yet Goldwater, like Bryan, was able to 
inject a concern about what White termed "the condition and 
quality of American morality and life" into political debate. 
It was a philosophy that men with greater skill would later 
explain and carry out more effectively.1 Goldwater's ideology 
can be seen in one of his disciples, Ronald Reagan. In 1981 
then President Reagan paid the Arizona Senator the ultimate 
compliment by asserting that if Barry Goldwater had not 
"walked that lonely road, some of us wouldn't be here 
tonight. "2
Goldwater undermined conservatism, nonetheless, because
1 White, Making of the President. 34 6.
2 Reinhard, Republican Right. 235.
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he misunderstood the principles that guide that particular 
school of thought. When Peter Viereck described conservatism 
as protecting "humanist reverence for the dignity of the 
individual soul," he envisioned a principle that Goldwater was 
unable to grasp in anything other than antiquated notions 
about free-enterprise, individual self-reliance, and strict 
constructionism.3 Indeed, Viereck himself lamented
Goldwater's preoccupation with free-market capitalism as a 
cure-all for the complex issues facing twentieth century life, 
and boldly disagreed with the notion that "historic Anglo- 
American conservatism, with its Disraeli-Churchill-Hughes- 
Roosevelt tradition of humane social reform, could ever be 
equated with the robber-baron kind of laissez-faire 
capitalism" that Goldwater and his followers seemed to 
embrace.4 A Burkean conservative would accept New Deal 
reforms as rooted institutions. Arthur Schlesinger shared 
Viereck's distrust of "Goldwater" conservatism. Early 
conservatives like Washington, Adams, and Hamilton possessed 
an interest in the national welfare that transcended mere 
"class interest." These were men of high intellectual caliber 
with an appreciation for history and a "realistic picture of 
social conflict." As such, they laid out the foundation of a 
strong national government that even agrarian liberals like
3 Viereck, Conservatism. 33.
4 Ibid., 140.
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Jefferson came to appreciate in time.5
Goldwater's alliance with the Republican right draws 
suspicion when one examines his support of various G.O.P. 
party candidates over the course of his career. He supported 
Dwight Eisenhower over Robert Taft in 1952, Richard Nixon over 
Ronald Reagan in 1968, and Gerald Ford over Reagan in 1976. 
In each case he forsook the candidate with greater allegiance 
to "conservative" ideals and supported the man who presumably 
stood a greater chance of winning. This caused Jonathan 
Kolkey to remark that conservatives "hardly needed deadly 
enemies with good friends like Barry Goldwater."6 What this 
trend reinforces, however, was the Senator's unyielding 
allegiance to the Republican party. However forcefully he 
deplored its lack of alternatives to Democratic liberalism, he 
worked within the party to press for the changes he desired. 
He was a politician first, a philosopher second. He knew that 
the Republican party could only be effective if it won 
elections, and threw his support to the candidates that stood 
the greatest chance of doing so. Thus emerged his uneasy 
alliance with Richard Nixon.
Goldwater's re-emergence during the Nixon administration 
proved equally enigmatic. Goldwater's comeback from oblivion 
to reclaim his Senate seat was a testament to his continued 
popularity in Arizona. Public disenchantment with the
5 Schlesinger, The Vital Center. 16.
6 Kolkey, New Right. 2 06.
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apparent lack of progress of either Great Society programs or 
civil rights, coupled with division over the Vietnam War, 
helped restore Goldwater's reputation. The man who was 
perceived as a dangerous radical in relatively peaceful times 
was now taken to be a man of honesty and stability in a period 
of social and political upheaval. Equally remarkable was the 
fact that the Senator was able to remain a powerful voice in 
both Congress and the G.O.P.
But his claim to fame as an outspoken critic of Richard 
Nixon himself is somewhat undeserved. Goldwater was 
apprehensive about much of the President's agenda, 
particularly in regard to his rapproachment with China and his 
policy of detente with the U.S.S.R. He did not, however, use 
his influence as a spokesman for party conservatives to change 
any substantive part of Nixon's administration. To be sure, 
Goldwater did attack Nixon's handling of the Watergate crisis, 
but only on tactical, not moral grounds. He continually 
believed the President's innocence until practically the eve 
of Nixon's resignation. Moreover, he quarreled with members 
of Congress and the media who insisted on pursuing the 
Watergate issue.
After Nixon's resignation, Goldwater continued in the 
Senate. He had mixed feelings about President Gerald Ford's 
pardon of Nixon. At the time he came out publicly in favor of 
the action, stating that it would help the country's healing 
process, but in his memoirs he claimed that the pardon was 
wrong, insisting that Nixon did not deserve to go free when
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many under his command were sent to prison. Goldwater fought 
the nomination of Nelson Rockefeller for Vice-President in 
1974. When Rockefeller was confirmed anyway, Goldwater 
concentrated on keeping him off the ticket in 1976, an effort 
that proved successful even though Ford lost the presidency 
that year to Democrat Jimmy Carter. When Ronald Reagan was 
elected President in 1980 and Republicans reclaimed control of 
the Senate, Goldwater was named Chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (a career-long ambition), where he served 
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